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Abstract
Data Science and Machine learning have been growing strong for
the past decade. We argue that to make the most of this exciting field
we should resist the temptation of assuming that forecasting can be
reduced to brute-force data analytics. This owes to the fact that mod-
elling, as we illustrate below, requires mastering the art of selecting
relevant variables.
More specifically, we investigate the subtle relation between “data
and models” by focussing on the role played by algorithmic complex-
ity, which contributed to making mathematically rigorous the long-
standing idea that to understand empirical phenomena is to describe
the rules which generate the data in terms which are “simpler” than
the data itself.
A key issue for the appraisal of the relation between algorithmic
complexity and algorithmic learning is to do with a much needed clar-
ification on the related but distinct concepts of compressibility, de-
terminism and predictability. To this end we will illustrate that the
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evolution law of a chaotic system is compressibile, but a generic initial
condition for it is not, making the time series generated by chaotic sys-
tems incompressible in general. Hence knowledge of the rules which
govern an empirical phenomenon are not sufficient for predicting its
outcomes. In turn this implies that there is more to understanding
phenomena than learning – even from data alone – such rules. This
can be achieved only in those cases when we are capable of “good
modelling”.
Clearly, the very idea of algorithmic complexity rests on Turing’s
seminal analysis of computation. This motivates our remarks on this
extremely telling example of analogy-based abstract modelling which
is nonetheless heavily informed by empirical facts.
KEYWORDS Models, algorithmic complexity, explanation, computation,
big data.
1 Introduction
Suppose that we could find a finite system of rules which enabled us to
say whether any given formula was demonstrable or not. This system
would embody a theorem of metamathematics. There is of course no
such theorem and this is very fortunate, since if there were we should
have a mechanical set of rules for the solution of all mathematical
problems, and our activities as mathematicians would come to an end.
[Hardy 1929]
Is data science proving what Hardy feared, but lightheartedly dismissed
as obviously false? For if we take Hardy’s “finite system of rules” to compress
algorithmically empirical data, and we take machine learning to be capable of
using this data to produce scientific knowledge, isn’t there reason to believe
that Hardy was indeed wrong?
It has been argued time and again in science and philosophy that the aim
of science is to organise in the most economical fashion the data collected
from experiments. Mach [Mach 1907, Mach 2014] championed this view,
which tuned out to be compelling to many scientists:
The so-called descriptive sciences must chiefly remain content
with reconstructing individual facts . . . . But in sciences that
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are more highly developed, rules for the reconstruction of great
numbers of facts may be embodied in a single expression.
It is remarkable that recently such an approach has been reconsidered
in the framework of algorithmic complexity [Li and Vita´nyi 2009] from re-
searchers without specific philosophical interests. For instance, Solomonoff,
one of the fathers of the theory of the algorithmic complexity, identifies a
scientific law with an algorithm for compressing the results of experiments
[Solomonoff 1964]:
The laws of science that have been discovered can be viewed as
summaries of large amounts of empirical data about the universe.
In the present context, each such law can be transformed into a
method of compactly coding the empirical data that gave rise to
the law.
Similar opinions are shared by [Barrow 2007], a scientist well know for
his popular books:
The intelligibility of the world amounts to the fact that we find
it to be algorithmically compressible. We can replace sequences
of facts and observational data by abbreviated statements which
contain the same information content. These abbreviations we
often call laws of Nature. If the world were not algorithmically
compressible, then there would exist no simple laws of Nature.
This view of the science, which puts at its center information and algo-
rithms, has unsurprisingly gained much interest and broad success in the last
decades. And this certainly created a favourable framework for the recent
rise of datacentric enthusiasm. We have put forward some methodological
words of caution about the temptation of replacing the art of scientific mod-
elling with the machine-aided analysis of time series [Coveney et al. 2016],
more generally we have argued [Hosni and Vulpiani 2018] that the accuracy
of forecasts need not be monotonic in the amount of data, – indeed the
opposite is true in paramount examples from dynamical systems.
Our present concern is to do with a rather subtle but frequent conceptual
confusion which is likely to arise in many scientific contexts which refer to
algorithmic complexity, information and chaos. Specifically it is a confusion
on the relation among the determinism, predictability, and the view according
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to which the scientific understanding of a phenomenon can be acccounted for
in terms of algorithmic compression.
A telling example is provided for instance, by Davies [Davies 1990]:
there is a wide class of physical systems, the so-called chaotic
ones, which are not algorithmically compressible.
This sounds intuitively appealing, but it is misleading. As we will see in
Section 3 the evolution law of a chaotic system is compressible. What is not
compressible is the time sequence generated by chaotic systems, and this, as
argued in [Chibbaro and Vulpiani 2017], is due to the non-compressibility of
a generic initial condition.
Hence, the aim of the present paper is to assess in some detail the method-
ological scope and relevance for scientific enquiry of the concepts of compres-
sion and algorithmic complexity. Before tackling our key question, namely
do scientific laws compress empirical data?, it is worth recalling that the
concepts of compression and algorithmic complexity are direct offsprings of
the visionary intuitions which led Alan Mathison Turing to provide an ab-
stract and very general model of computation, which in addition is capable
of identifying the bounds of and computability. Reviewing, if very quickly,
the path followed by Turing will give us precious insights in the subtle art of
modelling and how this depends on the careful selection of relevant data.
2 Alan Turing’s model of computation
The early 1930s have been dotted with deep results on the powers and limi-
tations of formal mathematical reasoning. Chief among them is Kurt Go¨del’s
proof of the existence of undecidable sentences in first order languages capa-
ble of expressing arithmetic. This marked a distinction between what can be
seen as mathematically true and what is mathematically provable: if proofs
are to be consistent, then there exists true statements which can neither be
proved nor disproved. And if this was not enough, one such undecidable
statement expresses the consistency of that very system of proof.
Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems left logically open the possibility that
the Entscheidungsproblem could be solved positively for first order logic. As
put by Hilbert and Ackermann
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The Entscheidungsproblem is solved if one knows a procedure
which will permit one to decide, using a finite number of opera-
tions, on the [satisfiability] of a given logical expression.
Of course the incompleteness result cast serious doubts on a positive
solution, but to prove that the Entscheidungsproblem was indeed unsolvable
one first needed to state it in a mathematically rigorous way rather than
resting on an intuitive understanding of a “procedure” or “algorithm”. This
was the task that Turing gave to computing machines in [Turing 1936] –
which have been called ever since Turing Machines – by means of which it
became possible to suppose that the informal concept of “effective procedure”
(or “algorithm”) coincides with the class of functions computable by means of
a Turing Machine. Armed with this formalisation, it was possible for Turing
to prove that the Entscheidungsproblem was indeed unsolvable. We are not,
at present, so much interested in either the proof or the consequences of this
result, which the interested reader can appreciate e.g. in [Davis 2000]. Rather
we are interested in recalling Turing’s initial motivation and formulation for
the definition of algorithmic procedure in [Turing 1936]. In other words, how
Turing constructed hismodel of computability. The reader who wishes to find
out more is referred to the unsurpassed analysis provided in [Gandy 1995]
by Turing’s only student at Manchester.
Turing arrives at his model of computation in four steps:
1. Finds out what is the right question to ask ;
2. Carries out an analogy with the human activity of computing and ob-
serves the cognitive limitations of humans as they carry out computa-
tions;
3. Claims that the actions and operations which define a Turing Machine
are sufficient to account for the concept of “effective procedure” i.e. for
a mathematical definition of algorithms.
Step 1) is of fundamental importance. The question as to whether all solv-
able problems can be solved algorithmically is clearly too vast to be tackled.
But Turing’s modelling genius allows him to see that there was no loss of
generality in asking which numbers are computable, i.e “real numbers whose
expressions as a decimal are calculable by finite means”. Then in step 2)
Turing imagines a human “computor” tackling this task and strips away all
the irrelevant features from the picture. So to compute, one needs to read,
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write and erase symbols on a large enough physical support (tape). And to
do so purposefully, the computor must perform those actions according to
the instructions provided by their state of mind. What cannot be stripped
away are the limitations of the human computor: there is only a limited
number of symbols that can be read, erased and written at the same time,
and the state of mind of the computor may contain only a finite number of
instructions. Those abstractions and constraints give Turing a model of com-
puting behaviour which relied only on finite means and a definite procedure.
Then, step 3) is the claim that the class of numbers (functions etc.) that
can be computed mechanically coincides with that computable by means of
a suitably defined Turing Machine. Within this model of computability Tur-
ing proved the undecidability of the Halting Problem, which establishes the
existence of well defined problems which cannot be solved algorithmically.
A far reaching consequence of this is that not all data can be compressed
algorithmically. If scientific understanding were adequately modelled by algo-
rithmic compressibility, this would imply that there are unknowable scientific
facts. But what would that mean?
3 Do scientific laws compress empirical data?
Let us begin by noting the rather obvious fact that once a scientific law has
been established, one has reached some sort compression. But care must
be placed in handling this conclusion. Especially when chaos enters the
picture. So let us follow Turing in delimiting the scope of our question to two
rather difficult and important problems which are useful to clarify the role
of chaos, initial conditions and algorithmic complexity in scientific practice:
first chaotic deterministic systems and second the features of fully developed
turbulence (FDT) [Frisch 1995].
3.1 Classical mechanics and chaos
As first we have to stress that there is a persistent confusion about determin-
ism, chaos and predictability. It is possible to understand that determinism
and predictability are completely unrelated. In few words we can say that
determinism is ontic and has to do with how Nature behaves, while pre-
dictability is epistemic and is related to what the human beings are able to
compute, On the other hand a careful analysis of chaotic systems in terms of
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the Lyapunov exponents and the Kolmogorov-Sinai entropy shows how de-
terministic chaos, although with an epistemic character, is non subjective at
all, for a detailed discussion see (Atmanspacher 2002, Chibbaro et al 2014).
It is well know that from the Newton equation and the gravitation law one
can derive many important astronomical facts, for instance the Kepler’s laws.
From this, however it is not completely correct to conclude that the Newton
equation and the gravitation law are capable of compressing all astronomical
behavior. Indeed, after the seminal contribution of Poincare´, we know that
a system of three bodies interacting with the gravitational force, usually is
chaotic.
Rather than developing this difficult question in full detail, let us consider
a one dimensional map:
xt+1 = 2xt mod 1 . (1)
This model, called Bernoulli shift, is known to be chaotic, i.e. a small initial
uncertainty increases exponentially, namely
δxt ∼ 2
tδx0 . (2)
In spite of its (apparent) simplicity the Bernoulli shift shares with the
three body problem many central features, so let us analyse the problem of
the compression, with accuracy ∆, of a sequence xt, 0 < t < T , generated
by the rule (1). In the parlance of algorithmic information theory, this is
equivalent to the problem of transmitting the sequence to say, a friend. At
first glance, the problem seems quite simple: we could opt for transmitting x0
and the rule (1), which costs a number of bits independent of T . Our friend
would then be left with the task of generating the sequence x1, x2, ..., xT .
However, we must also choose the number of bits to which x0 should be
specified. From (2), the accuracy ∆ at time T requires accuracy δ0 ∼ 2
−T∆
for x0, hence that the number of bits specifying x0 grows with T .
Writing the initial condition in the forms
x0 =
∑
n=1
an
2n
= (a1, a2, ....) (3)
we understand that the evolution law of (1) is nothing but a shift of the
binary point of the sequence {a1, a2, ..., }. So we have to tackle the problem
of the complexity of a sequence of symbols, {a0, a1, ...}.
Recall that the evolution of x0 is regular (e.g. periodic) if its sequence
{a1, a2, ..., } is not complex, while it is irregular if {a1, a2, ..., } cannot be
compressed.
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Therefore both in systems with regular behavior (e.g. the pendulum)
and in chaos (e.g. the three body or the Bernoulli’s shift) the evolution law
is straightforward to compress. The difference between the two classes of
systems lies with the outputs: which are always regular in the pendulum,
whereas in the Bernoulli’s shift can be regular or irregular at varying initial
conditions.
The conclusion is that, in a deterministic system, the details of the time
evolution are well hidden in the initial condition which is, typically incom-
pressibile. This follows from an important result of Martin-Lo¨f who showed
that almost all infinite binary sequences, which express the real numbers in
[0, 1], are complex [Martin- Lo¨f 1966]. Note that the identification random-
ness with incompressibility put forward by Martin-Lo¨f (and further developed
by Kolmogorov and Chaitin) follows rather closely the modelling footsteps of
Turing’s model of computation. Indeed it has become standard to refer to the
claim that “incompressibility” is the mathematically rigorous counterpart of
“random” as the Martin-Lo¨f Thesis [Li and Vita´nyi 2009].
3.2 Turbulence
Turbulent flows, a paradigmatic case of complex system, are governed by
the Navier-Stokes equations (NSE) which can be written in two lines. So,
naively, one could conclude that, since we know the equation for the time
evolution of the velocity field, somehow, the phenomenon of turbulence has
been compressed. The study of some specific aspects of the turbulence al-
lows for the understanding of the precise meaning of such a conclusion. As
first we consider the initial conditions, of course in any experiment they are
necessarily known with a limited precision. A rather severe limitation is due
to the fact that in the limit of very large Reynolds numbers Re for a proper
description of the turbulent velocity field it is necessary to consider a huge
number of variables which increases quickly with Re. Therefore for the typ-
ical values of Re in the limit of fully developed turbulence (FDT), because
of the gigantic amount of data necessary to describe the involved degrees of
freedom, we have an obvious impossibility to access to the initial conditions
with the proper accuracy.
In addition at large Re the NSE are chaotic: the distance between two ini-
tially close initial conditions increase very fast. Therefore as consequence of
the practical impossibility to access the initial conditions with high accuracy,
and the presence of deterministic chaos, even a very powerful computer and
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accurate numerical algorithms is not possible to perform a simulation of the
NSE for a long term and compare the prediction with the experimental re-
sults.
Since the practical impossibility to compare the experimental results with
the numerical computation of the velocity field, we cannot say that the NSE
are able to compress the turbulent behaviors. Nevertheless there is a general
consensus on the validity of the NSE for the FDT. We can mention at least
four items supporting the opinion that NSE are able to describe FDT, the
agreement of the results observed in FDT and those obtained by the NSE
for:
a) short time prediction of the velocity field;
b) long time prediction of averaged (e.g. spatially caorse grained) quantities;
c) the scaling laws, and more generally, the statistical features;
d)] the qualitative and quantitative spatio-temporal features (e.g. large scale
coherent structures).
4 Science only from data?
The NSE have been derived on a theoretical basis using the Newton equations
and assuming the hypothesis of the continuity of matter plus some thermody-
namic considerations. In other words, by modelling. One can wonder about
the possibility to obtain the NSE just looking directly at experimental data.
A less ambitious task, but with the same conceptual aspects, is to build
models in finite dimension on the basis of experimental data [Gershenfeld and Weigend 1994].
And again for sake of simplicity only, let us focus on the discrete time case.
The most favourable case is clearly the one in which we know that the state
of the system at time k is a finite dimensional vector xk. So let us start from
here and consider the problem of making predictions from the available data,
i.e. a long time sequence.
The natural approach is to search for a past state similar to the present
state of a given phenomenon of interest, then, looking at the sequence of
events that followed the past state, one may infer by analogy the evolution
that will follow the present state [Cecconi et al. 2012]. In other words, given
a known sequence of analogues, i.e. of past states x1, ...,xM which resemble
each other closely in pairs, so that |xk − xM | < ǫ with ǫ reasonably small,
one makes the approximate prediction:
xM+1 = xk+1
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if xk is an analogue of xM .
In the case the above protocol can be used, one may then proceed to build
a model of the phenomenon, i.e. to determine a function f(x) such that the
sequences of states is well approximated by the dynamical system
xk+1 = f(xk) . (4)
The application of this method requires knowledge of at least one ana-
logue. It is possible to realise, – and this is the Kac lemma – that such
knowledge requires sufficiently long sequences, at least of duration of order
TR ∼ (L/ǫ)
D, where, if the system is dissipative, D is the dimension of the
attractor, basically D is the number of relevant variables.
The exponential growth of TR as a function of D has a severe impact on
our ability to make predictions, and build the evolution law (4), solely relying
on previously acquired data. One can say that D larger than 6 renders the
approach described here useless, because it makes it practically impossible
to observe the ”same” state twice, i.e. within an acceptable accuracy ǫ.
On the other hand typically the state of the system, i.e. the variables which
describe the phenomenon under investigation, is not known. Therefore an
unavoidable technical aspect is the determination of proper state of the sys-
tem from the study of a time series {u1, u2, ..., uM}, where u is an observable.
The most relevant result for such a problem is due to Takens [Takens 1981]
who has been able to show that, at least from a mathematical point of view,
it is possible (if we know that the system is deterministic and is described
by a finite dimensional vector) to determine the proper variable X. In a
nutshell: there is a finite integer m such that the delay coordinate vector (of
dimension m)
y
(m)
k
= (uk, uk−1, .., uk−m+1)
can faithfully reconstruct the properties of the underlying dynamics, from
heuristic arguments one can expect m = [D] + 1.
Of course the practical limitation due to the exponential increasing of TR
as function of D, is present also in the Takens’s method; therefore we have
rather severe practical limitations.
A way out of this practical limitation, as we argued in [Cecconi et al. 2012,
Hosni and Vulpiani 2018] consists a careful selection of the relevant features
of the phenomenon of interest, that is to say, in modelling. Weather forecast-
ing provides a very telling example of this, one which clarifies that the main
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limit to predictions based on analogs is not the sensitivity to initial condi-
tions, typical of chaos. But, as first realized by Lorenz [Cecconi et al. 2012]
the key difficulty lies with the problem of finding good analogues.
The first modern steps in weather forecasting are due to Richardson
[Lynch 2006] who, in his visionary work, introduced many of the ideas on
which modern meteorology is based. His approach was, to a certain extent,
in line with genuine reductionism, and may be summarised as follows: the
atmosphere evolves according to the hydrodynamic (and thermodynamics)
equations for the velocity, the density, and so on. Therefore, future weather
can be predicted, in principle at least, by solving the proper partial differ-
ential equations, with initial conditions given by the present state of the
atmosphere.
The key idea by Richardson to forecast the weather was correct, but in
order to put it in practice it was necessary to introduce one further ingredient
that he could not possibly have known [Lynch 2006]. After few decades von
Neumann and Charney noticed that the equations originally proposed by
Richardson, even though correct, are not suitable for weather forecasting
[Lynch 2006, Hosni and Vulpiani 2018]. The apparently paradoxical reason
is that they are too accurate: they also describe high-frequency wave motions
that are irrelevant for meteorology. So it is necessary to construct effective
equations that get rid of the fast variables.
The effective equations have great practical advantages, e.g. it is possible
to adopt large integration time steps making the numerical computations
satisfactorily efficient. Even more importantly, they are able to capture the
essence of the phenomena of interest, which could otherwise be hidden in too
detailed a description, as in the case of the complete set of original equations.
It is important to stress that the effective equations are not mere approxima-
tions of the original equations, and they are obtained with a subtle mixture
of hypotheses, theory and observations [Chibbaro and Vulpiani 2017]. Just
like the cognitive limitations of any human computer provided Turing with
constraints which shaped crucially his model of computability.
5 Final remarks and conclusion
Let us add to the examples discussed in Sections 3 and 4 two further remarks,
which will lend themselves to a more general conclusion.
The relevance of the scale resolution is linked with the effective variables
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describing a phenomenon. One understands such a topic considering a fluid
which can be described in terms of its molecules; in such an approach the
correct variables are the positions and momenta of the molecules. So we have
a very accurate description containing a lot of informations. On the other
hand, often this approach is not interesting, for instance in engineering (or
geophysical) problems we describe a fluid in terms of few fields (for velocity,
temperature and so on). Therefore one has a huge decreasing of the amount
of information and an increasing of the possibility to compress data.
Second, a remark on the qualitative aspects of science, which, sometimes,
are considered to be less important than the quantitative ones. Some results
cannot be expressed in terms of numerical sequences, but they can be in-
teresting and rigorous. We can mention the Lotka-Volterra like equations:
it is not possible to find the explicit solution, but one can show that the
time behavior is periodic. In a similar way, in some celestial mechanics prob-
lems, it is enough to be sure that the motion (e.g. of an asteroid) remain
in a bounded region [Cencini et al. 2010]. The previous qualitative results,
although cannot be formalized in terms of algorithmic compression (which
involves sequences) are genuine forms of compression of information.
So, here is, in conclusion, the gist of our argument. The claim that the
world is comprehensible because it is algorithmically compressible is, in our
opinion, a truism, which is equivalent to saying that laws of nature exist.
Like many truisms, it may well have heuristic value. For instance in the
familiar situations which present a series of numbers which we are invited
to continue appropriately. Guessing rightly the intended continuation of the
series, by all means, is to undestand how the series is generated, i.e. the
law which governs it. But, as we argued above, there are serious limitations
in generalising this approach to the wider and multifarious field of scientific
knowledge. The fact that we know the law ruling a certain phenomena does
not imply that we are able to control (e.g. predict) the system. This has
been discussed for a simple example of chaotic system (Bernoulli shift) and
for the Navier-Stokes equation for fluids.
Disregarding the distinction between initial conditions and laws of nature
can lead to great confusion. For instance [Davies 1990] claims that chaotic
systems are not algorithmically compressible. On the other hand, as dis-
cussed in Sect. 2, the evolution law ruling chaotic systems can be trivially
compressible (in the sense that it is easy to write down the evolution laws, as,
e.g., for the Bernoulli’s shift). What can be not compressible is the output
and this is related to the complexity of the sequence associated to the initial
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condition.
We have pointed out the importance of the concept of state of the system,
i.e. in mathematical terms, the variables which describe the phenomenon un-
der investigation, which is often overlooked and its relevance underestimated.
Only in few cases, e.g. in mechanical systems, it is easy to identify the vari-
ables which describe the phenomenon. On the contrary, in a generic case,
there are serious difficulties; we can say that the main effort in building a the-
ory on nontrivial phenomena concerns the identification of the appropriate
variables.
This difficulty is well-known in the context of statistical physics: Onsager
and Machlup, in their seminal work on fluctuations and irreversible processes,
stressed the problem with the caveat [Onsager and Machlup 1953].
how do you know you have taken enough variables, for it to be
Markovian?
In a similar way, [Ma 1985] notes that
the hidden worry of thermodynamics is: we do not know how
many coordinates or forces are necessary to completely specify an
equilibrium state.
Unfortunately, usually we have no definitive method for selecting the proper
variables and only a deep theoretical understanding can suggest the “good
ones”. We have recalled that choosing the right question to ask and cutting
down the number of variables according to the relevant practical limitations,
were two of the key steps which led Alan Turing to his model of effective com-
putation. Nearly a century on, the very same ideas stand still as guidelines
for the subtle art of (algorithmic) modelling.
On the other hand, if the laws are not known and we have just the pos-
sibility to study time series, the scenario is quite pessimistic. If the effective
dimensionality is (relatively) large, even in the most simple case of deter-
ministic system, it is not possible to find the evolution laws and therefore to
perform an explicit compression [Chibbaro and Vulpiani 2017].
The above difficulties have been often underestimated by the supporters
of a science based only on data and algorithms, for a recent detailed critics of
such an approach which tries to avoid the use of any theory, see [Mezard 2018,
Buchanan 2019].
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